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Too Many Foreign Policy Experts

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. ROBERT R. BARRY *

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1960

Mr. BARRY. Mr. Speaker, there appeared Friday in the Herald Statesman of Yonkers, N.Y., an excellent editorial which cuts through the confused babble of comment on the President's recent Far East tour and points up the general misinterpretation of the results.

The editorial comments that it has compelled the Communists once more to show that they have a frantic fear of the principle apostle of international peace, President Eisenhower, and will do everything possible to prevent him from visiting other nations. What greater proof could there be of his persuasive effect and the importance the Communists place on the President's tours? The Communists will use every means at their command to prevent more nations of the world from being exposed to the powerful pro-Westernizing effect of the Eisenhower charm.

More of this kind of clear thinking would be welcome instead of the recurrent talk of failure.

[From the Yonkers (N.Y.) Herald Statesman, June 17, 1960]

TOO MANY FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS

If the American people have confused notions about our foreign policy, that confusion has been caused by a proliferation of experts who just are not experts at all.

The news that the Japanese Government had asked President Eisenhower to postpone, or cancel, his impending trip to Tokyo was only minutes old before the air was filled with wordy characterizations of the situation as evidence of the failure of American diplomacy.

Leading Members of the opposition in Congress suddenly decided that the President never should have planned to go to Japan—that, as one of them put it, "he should have known" his plan might be nullified by Communist and national-leftist riots in Tokyo.

All of this it seems to us, constitutes gross misunderstanding, a misrepresentation of the facts, and a very poor evaluation of what will be the probable effects of the Tokyo situation of free world opinion.

To be sure, the President and his advisers knew he might face hostile demonstrations in Japan. They knew that, even if the U-2 incident had occurred, he would have expected Khrushchev to be truculently offensive at Paris. But the President's course of response seem to us, to have been perfectly plain in each case: he would go ahead and do his duty right and necessary, and let the Communists take the responsibility before the eyes of all the world, for power-grip tactics, violent interference with peaceful and hope for peace in the world.

Who would have dared to suggest for decency and justice, and the respect of a heightened respect of a free world, courage and dignity, the freedom of a United States, or the integrity of a China-shop?

Who would

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the Communists to show their ineptness in violent hands in Tokyo?

Who has compelled them, once more, to show that they are actually the principle apostle of international peace? The man, of course, whose personal prestige and influence they only too obviously regard as a dire threat to the success of their schemes for world domination.

It would have been a "failure of American diplomacy" only if the President had been able to go to Tokyo as a man whose travels were of no disturbing concern to Moscow or Peking.

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